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Introduction
Since its enactment in 1982, expectations and apprehensions about how the Charter might
change us – for better or for worse – have had time to settle. While constitutional rights will ever
spark controversy, Canada is for the most part content with, and proud of, its Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.1
As always, the override stands watch over the Charter’s guarantees, its presence a constant
and implacable warning that rights are subject to legislative recall. Section 33’s “notwithstanding”
mechanism acts as a brake on rights, empowering legislatures to override constitutional guarantees
and immunize laws from Charter review.2 Without it, constitutional rights would have failed,
because a textual caveat preserving a role for legislative supremacy was a non-negotiable condition
of the Charter’s adoption.3 Since its inception, s.33 has ruled from the background, placing a
constant and unpredictable burden on the Charter’s rights and freedoms.
Always a provocation, the override stirs controversy even when quiescent. It can easily be
forgotten that constitutional rights were initiated amid profound uncertainty about s.33 and its
impact on the Charter. To some, planting an override in a document purporting to constitutionalize
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1
Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c.11.
2
Section 33, which in this article is referred to as the override, empowers legislatures to enact laws
“notwithstanding” s.2 and ss.7 to 15 of the Charter (s.33(1) & 2), requires an express declaration to activate the
override (s.33(1)), places a 5-year limit on s.33 legislation (s.33(3)), and provides for the override’s renewal
(s.33(4)).
3
In the words of then Prime Minister Trudeau, “it is a regressive Section but it was necessary to reach a compromise
… because some Premiers did not want the full Charter”, House of Commons Debates, 20 September 1983, at
27292.
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rights was incoherent because it legitimized derogations and encouraged legislatures to negate
Charter entitlements.4 In allaying those concerns, the leaders of Canada’s constitutional patriation
described s.33 as a failsafe that would remain dormant in all but rare or exceptional circumstances. 5
Little in the provision supports that view because the textual constraints are modest, and
legislatures have the power to override the Charter’s rights and freedoms essentially at will.
Once the text’s architectural see-saw of rights and their override was set in motion, the
Charter’s guarantees initially co-existed in relative peace with s.33.6 While not dormant, the
override was used sparingly and, albeit with exceptions, did not corrode the Charter’s core
protections.7 Over the years, s.33 was feted in academic scholarship praising the override as part
of dialogue theory, an innovative feature of rights constitutionalism, and the inspiration for the
“Commonwealth” model of rights protection.8
Recently, the override has resurfaced more ominously than before, and fears that s.33 will
be invoked with increasing regularity to emasulate the Charter’s essential promises are now real.
Those concerns arise principally in Quebec and Ontario, where provincial governments have relied

As Maxwell Cohen stated, “[i]t is simply not possible to say, in the same breath, let us have a doctrine of
supremacy of Parliament, let us have a supremacy of Charter regime”. “Colliding Visions: The Debate over the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1980-81” in J. Weiler and R. Elliott, eds., Litigating the Values of a Nation: The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto, Carswell, 1986) 24.
5
J. Chrétien, “Bringing the Constitution Home”, in T. Axworthy and P.E. Trudeau, eds., Towards a Just Society:
The Trudeau Years (ON: Viking Press, 1990) 306 (stating that the override would “only be used in the most extreme
and compelling circumstances”).
6
In 2000, Howard Leeson described the override as a compromise that “leaves no one happy, but no one hurt”.
“Section 33, the Notwithstanding Clause: A Paper Tiger?”, in Russell and Howe, eds., Choices: Courts or
Legislatures, Vol.6 No.2 (2000), at 4.
7
The government of Quebec passed omnibus legislation overriding the Charter following the Constitution’s 1982
patriation; An Act Respecting the Constitution Act, 1982, C.Q.L.R., c-L-4.2. The province also used the override in
response to Ford v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712; An Act to Amend the Charter of the French Language, 1988, c.54.
8
See generally, S. Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice (UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2013). For a comment on this phenomenon, see J. Cameron, “Collateral Thoughts on
Dialogue’s Legacy as Metaphor and Theory” (2016), 35(1) U. of Queensland L.J. 157.
4
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on s.33 to enact legislation promoting majoritarian dominance and suppressing electoral rights of
democratic participation.9
The override’s ascent as a rights-negating mechanism has prompted renewal in the
scholarship and a quest to carve out a residual role for judicial review of s.33 legislation. Emergent
theories challenge the longstanding assumption that the override is a “no go” zone, maintaining
instead that s.33 does not disable it, but accepts and even requires a form of constitutional review.
Though there are variations, these proposals maintain that, short of invalidating it, courts can play
an active role in interpreting s.33 legislation.10 Others resist the suggestion that the override is
amenable to review, even dismissing it as a form of constitutional heresy.11 This debate is the
current generation’s iteration of and response to the contradiction that defined the Charter in 1982
and has dogged its evolution in the first 40 years. At this time, the discussion is no longer abstract,
but arises in settings where s.33 legislation has endangered the central foundations of rights
protection under the Charter.
A fresh issue stirred by recent s.33 legislation concerns the untouchable rights that cannot
be overridden. Only three in number, these guarantees comprise the Charter’s democratic rights

9

See An Act respecting the laicity of the State, S.Q. 2019, c.12 (Bill 21), and An act respecting French, the official
and common language of Quebec, S.Q. 2022, c.14 (Bill 96). In Ontario, see The Protecting Elections and Defending
Democracy Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c.31 (Bill 307).
10
See, e.g., G. Webber, E. Mendelsohn & R. Leckey, “The Faulty Received Wisdom around the Notwithstanding
Clause”, Policy Options (10 May 2019), online: https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/may-2019/faulty-wisdomnotwithstanding-clause/; R. Leckey & E. Mendelsohn, “The Notwithstanding Clause: Legislatures, Courts, and the
Electorate” (2022) 72 UTLJ 189; G. Webber, “Notwithstanding Rights, Review, or Remedy? On the
Notwithstanding Clause and the Operation of Legislation” (2021) 71 UTLJ 537.
11
See, e.g., M. St-Hilaire & X. Ménard, “Nothing to Declare: A Response to Grégoire Webber, Eric Mendolsohn,
Robert Leckey, and Léonid Sirota on the Effects of the Notwithstanding Clause” (2020) 29 Constitutional Forum 38
(stating that their arguments constitute a “creative but ultimately erroneous development in legal thought on s.33”),
online: https://journals.library.ualberta.ca/constitutional_forum/index.php/constitutional_forum/article/view/29401.
See also, G. Rousseau & F, Coté, “A Distinctive Quebec Theory and Practice of the Notwithstanding Clause: When
Collective Interests Outweigh Individual Rights”, (2017) 47 R.G.D. 343; D. Newman, “Canada’s Notwithstanding
Clause, Dialogue, and Constitutional Identity”, in G. Sigalet, G. Webber & R. Dixon, Constitutional Dialogue:
Rights, Democracy, Institutions (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
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(ss.3-5), mobility rights (s.6), and minority language rights (s.23).12 As Hak v. Quebec
demonstrates, setting these rights apart and insulating them from s.33 can lead to seeming
anomalies. There, the Quebec Superior Court selectively invalidated provisions that violate s.3’s
right to vote and s.23’s minority language education, but found that Bill 21’s override pre-empted
challenges to Quebec’s mandatory secularism law under ss.2 and 7 to 15 of the Charter.13 Those
carve-outs from s.33 provided vital relief from Bill 21’s ban on wearing religious symbols to give
or receive certain public services, but only in those domains.
In Ontario, Bill 307 relied on s.33 to re-instate Bill 254 and its unconstitutional restrictions
on third party political advertising. 14 Though both Bills unjustifiably violate s.2(b), whether Bill
307 also breaches s.3 raises a different set of considerations, which includes the relationship
between the Charter’s democratic rights and s.33.15 The right to vote may not be subject to s.33,
but that does not sideline the override in an analysis of Bill 307’s constitutionality.
In marking the first time override legislation forms the backdrop to s.3’s interpretation,
Working Families v. Ontario (Working Families #2) contemplates s.33’s novel role in the
analysis.16 Bill 307’s use of the override places the relationship between ss.33 and the right to vote
in sharp relief, exposing a symbiotic relationship between the two that informs the Charter’s
democratic rights. Democratic accountability, a principle that grounds the underlying assumptions

12

Section 33(1) explicitly states that s.2 and ss.7 to 15 of the Charter are subject to the legislative override; other
guarantees that are not specifically included in its scope are excluded.
13
2021 QCSC 1466.
14
After Working Families Ontario v. Ontario, 2021 ONSC 4076 (Working Families #1), declared Bill 254 invalid
on June 8, 2021, the Ontario legislation responding by enacting Bill 307 less than one week later. The legislation
was introduced, debated, and enacted, receiving royal assent by June 14, 2021.
15
Bill 254 amended the Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.E7, which for the first time introduced pre-writ
restrictions on third party political advertising. Among other things, Bill 254 – The Protecting Ontario Elections Act,
2021 – doubled the pre-election restrictions to twelve months, but retained the third party global spending amount of
$600,000. Bill 254’s 12-month period of restrictions was declared unconstitutional, and Bill 307, which re-enacted
the same restrictions, is also unconstitutional under s.2(b), but protected by the override.
16
2021 ONSC 4076 (upholding Bill 307). Working Families #2 is on appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal, where
decision is pending.
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of both, establishes a critical bond between these provisions of the Charter. That bond requires
vigorous enforcement of the right to vote, not only to protect s.3’s democratic rights, but also to
legitimize s.33’s legislative override. Put simply, the legitimacy of s.33 and its theory of
democratic accountability are contingent on an interpretation of s.3 that prohibits interference with
the democratic process. As explained below, Bill 307 violates s.3 because it interferes with that
process and undermines the voter’s right to cast an informed vote.
Not only does it inform the constitutionality of Bill 307, the symbiosis between ss.3 and
33 has broad implications for Canada’s system of democratic constitutionalism. A finding that Bill
307 breaches s.3 re-inforces established principles of interpretation that anchor democratic
accountability in the Charter’s text and architecture. Working Families #2 therefore marks a
turning point in the evolution of the override because it calls on the courts to protect the Charter’s
democratic rights, especially and a fortiori when s.33 legislation substantially impairs critically
important avenues of participation in pre-electoral public discourse.
This brief article develops a revelatory interpretation of ss. 3 and 33. The next section
analyzes the textual relationship between these provisions, showing how deeply the accountability
principle is embedded in each. That principle informs the legitimacy of s.33 and plays a key role
in defining the scope of s.3’s entitlements. From there, the discussion turns to s.3 to explain how
legislation that violates the s.2(b) rights of third party political advertisers also offends and
undermines the s.3 rights of citizen voters. Throughout, the analysis draws on unwritten
constitutional principles – specifically, the democratic principle and its corollaries of
accountability and unfettered and free public discussion – to inform the interpretation of s.3.
On that point, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in City of Toronto v. Ontario
emphasized the primacy of the text in constitutional adjudication and directed a relatively narrow

6

interpretive role for unwritten principles.17 Notably, the majority opinion stated that protection
from perceived injustices cannot be found in “amorphous” underlying principles but rests, instead,
“in the text of the Constitution and the ballot box”. 18 That, in short, is precisely and exactly the
point of this article: that the texts of ss.3 and 33, informed by the principle of democratic
accountability, guarantee the integrity of the ballot box and the entitlements that safeguard the
democratic rights of the electorate.
While s.33 empowers legislatures to override s.2(b)’s rights of democratic participation,
its carve-out for s.3 expresses textual intolerance for derogations from ballot-box rights that are
guaranteed by the Charter. As explained below, the accountability principle requires vigilant
scrutiny and enforcement of these entitlements, which include the right of meaningful participation
and access to information that can influence the vote, both during and outside the period of the
election writ.

Sections 3 and 33: constitutional text and the principle of democratic accountability
The constitutionality of Bill 307’s restrictions on pre-writ third party political advertising
pivots on the texts of ss.3 and 33, and their symbiotic connection to the principle of democratic
accountability. That principle aligns these provisions, creating a textual and interpretive bond
between the two and the democratic imperative that is the foundation of Canada’s system of
constitutionalism. In complement, these provisions of the Charter serve this unassailable function
mutually and symbiotically with each other.

17

City of Toronto v. Ontario, 2021 SCC 34, at para. 73 (citing British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.,
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 473).
18
Ibid. at para. 59 (citing Imperial Tobacco).
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Democratic accountability is a constituent element of the democratic principle and one of
the Constitution’s primordial values. In the Secession Reference, the Supreme Court linked
accountability to the consent of the governed and the legitimacy of democratic institutions that
“must allow for the participation of, and accountability to, the people, through public
institutions”.19 The Court bolstered the point, drawing a link between a functioning democracy and
a continuous process of discussion, stating that the Constitutions mandates government by
democratic legislatures, and an executive accountable to them.20
As a matter of text, ss.3 and 33 are explicitly linked to the principle of democratic
accountability. For instance, in guaranteeing the citizen’s right to vote and requiring a general
election to be held not less than once every five years, ss.3 and 4 clearly and purposively serve the
democratic principle and its objective of democratic accountability. 21 Moreover, excluding ss.3
and 4 from the override highlights the sacrosanct status of these entitlements and prohibits
legislatures from interfering with or corrupting the democratic process.22 These points are
insistently confirmed and entrenched in the s.3 jurisprudence. 23
Meanwhile, s.33 serves democratic purposes somewhat differently, empowering
legislatures to override Charter guarantees and shield statutory provisions from Charter review.
Democratic accountability is the fundamental condition of s.33, because that is what makes it

19

Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, para. 67.
Ibid. at para. 68.
21
Section 3 guarantees every citizen the right to vote in provincial and federal, but not municipal or other elections,
and s.4 places a 5-year limit on a legislature’s electoral mandate.
22
See Secession Reference, supra note 19, at para. 65 (stating that the democratic principle is affirmed with
particular clarity in that s.4 is not subject to s.33). See also P. Weiler, P. Weiler, “Rights and Judges in a Democracy:
A New Canadian Version”, 18 U of Mich J of Law Reform 51, at 84 (1984) (describing the “full entrenchment” of
democratic rights as “insurance against the remote possibility of a government’s attempt to perpetuate itself by
denying basic rights of participation”).
23
Infra, note 34. See also Thomson Newspapers v. Canada (AG), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877, at para. 79 (stating that
although the override is rarely invoked, “the fact that s.3 is immune from such power “clearly places it at the heart of
our constitutional democracy”).
20
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legitimate for legislatures to override the Charter’s rights and freedoms. For that reason, the text
promotes accountability by hedging s.33’s democratic prerogative in important ways. First, a
legislature that chooses to engage the override must provide a “sufficiently express declaration of
override” to meet s.33(1)’s requirement of form. 24 Albeit far from onerous, this requirement is
designed to draw attention to the override, promoting an informed and reasoned debate in the
legislature and public discourse about the decision to invoke s.33. Accountability is contingent on
a concept of transparency that requires governments to disclose the essential elements of s.33
legislation and engage a process of wide public discussion.25
Second, s.33(3)’s “sunset clause” textualizes the principle of accountability by
automatically expiring override legislation five years after its enactment. It is no accident that
s.33’s 5-year lifespan cross-references s.4’s equivalent lifespan for the mandate of federal and
provincial governments: to pause and emphasize this critical point, s.33’s sunset clause is precisely
in tempo with s.4’s requirement of a general election within the same interval. Separately and
together, the 5-year limit on an electoral mandate and lifespan of s.33 legislation entrench
mechanisms of democratic accountability. Just as democratically elected governments are subject
to accountability through s.4’s 5-year electoral interval, s.33 demands accountability five years
after any s.33 legislation it has enacted.
The principle of democratic accountability is valuable to constitutional interpretation in
this context because it aligns ss.3 and 33. Specifically, s.33’s requirement of accountability cannot
be satisfied unless the Charter’s democratic rights are vigorously protected. The sunset clause and
its objective of calling governments to account for enacting s.33 legislation can only work where

24

Ford v Quebec, [1988] 2 SCR 712, at para 33.
See Weiler, supra note 22, at 81 (stating that to use s.33 a government would have to “use a formula” designed to
draw the proposal to the attention of the opposition, the press, and the general public).
25
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s.3’s rights are protected from partisan and other forms of interference. The result may seem
paradoxical – even subversive – because it requires s.3’s voting rights to be enforced against s.33
legislation in order to defend the override’s own democratic purposes. Few objectives are as close
to the heart of the Charter as this.
At its inception, s.33 was grounded in and contingent on these principles of accountability
and transparency. In reflecting on the override, Jean Chrétien explained that s.33’s requirements
of a notwithstanding declaration and 5-year lifespan were intended to discourage governments
from using the override. In particular, the sunset clause would require periodic public debate about
the legitimacy of overriding the Charter and discourage the “ill-considered” use of s.33.26 Roy
McMurtry, another prominent leader during the patriation negotiations, declared that “political
accountability is the best safeguard against any improper use of the ‘override clause’ by any
parliament in the future”.27 Civil liberties leader Alan Borovoy called the override a “red flag” for
the opposition parties and press, predicting that it would be politically difficult for a legislature to
override the Charter, and concluding that “[p]olitical difficulty is a reasonable safeguard for the
Charter”.28
These views are also reflected in the academic commentary. Professor Weiler, who
promoted and defended the override, explained that “representative democracy implies a structural
core consisting of periodic elections” and a public that has been educated about the issues “through
vigorous public commentary, especially by an uninhibited press”. 29 Though it gives the people a
say after the fact, the five-year sunset mechanism requires the legislatures and the electorate to

J. Chrétien, “Bringing the Constitution Home”, supra note 3, at 305.
R. McMurtry, “The Search for a Constitutional Accord – A Personal Memoir”, (1982) 8 Queen’s LJ 28, at 65
(emphasis added).
28
Quoted in Dickson, “Alberta and the Notwithstanding Clause” (2000) LawNow 41.
29
Ibid. at 67.
26
27
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think the problem through again and again. 30 Professor Russell is another influential scholar who
supported it because the override would provoke a process of “wide public discussion so that the
politically active citizenry participate in and share responsibility for the outcome”. 31 At the same
time, he cautioned that, though it provides an opportunity for “responsible and accountable public
discussion of rights issues”, that purpose could be “seriously undermined” if legislatures were free
to use the override without discussion and deliberation.32
Exempting the Charter’s democratic rights from s.33 confirms that the legitimacy of the
override is contingent on a process of democratic accountability. Legislatures can only be called
to account for overriding Charter rights when the sanctity of the democratic process is preserved
by prohibiting governments from violating ss.3 and 4. Put another way, the theory of the override
requires ss.3 and 4 to be excluded, because empowering legislatures to negate these guarantees
would defeat s.33’s embedded principle of accountability. Ominously, subjecting democratic
rights to an override would compromise s.33’s legitimacy and threaten the Constitution’s system
of democratic constitutionalism.
Theories for the renewal of s.33 support this conception through a functional approach to
s.33 and its underlying principle of accountability. As Leckey and Mendolsohn argue, the
electorate cannot fully perform its duty to hold legislatures accountable without access to
information about the constitutionality of s.33 legislation. Accordingly, they maintain that the
judiciary can and should support the public’s “constitutional role”, making declarations that enable
the electorate to assess s.33 legislation and decide whether or how to hold the legislature
accountable for enacting it. Though it does not rest on a textual link to s.3, and addresses the status

Weiler, “Rights and Judges”, supra note 22 at 82, n99.
P. Russell, “Standing Up for Notwithstanding”, (1991) 29 Alta L Rev 293 at 299.
32
Ibid. at 299 (emphasis added).
30
31
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of rights that are subject to s.33 legislation, this conception of review complements and is
consistent with the proposition that the override’s legitimacy depends on the efficacy of
mechanisms of accountability. That point is especially compelling when s.33 legislation overrides
s.2(b) in circumstances that place s.3’s non-derogable democratic rights at stake.33
Though s.3 should receive a robust and generous interpretation in all cases, Bill 307
presents a distinctive and unprecedented challenge to the Charter’s democratic rights. Where s.33
legislation eliminates other guarantees like s.2(b), courts must be vigilant in thwarting any threat
to the integrity of the democratic process. As explained, democratic accountability is as essential
to the legitimacy of s.33 as it is to s.3’s democratic rights. Where override legislation undercuts
rights of democratic participation during a lengthy pre-writ period, s.33 and its concept of
democratic accountability inform the interpretation of s.3. As such, s.33’s underlying assumption
of accountability aligns with s.3’s role in protecting and preserving the Charter’s concept of
democratic constitutionalism.
Another aspect of the democratic principle that cannot be forgotten is the role of
participation as a core element of a functioning democracy. That principle is also embedded in the
architecture of the Charter’s democratic rights, and a constitutional jurisprudence that identifies
free, unfettered discussion and access to information as the sine qua non of a functioning
democracy. As explained in the next section, these values inflect and infuse s.3’s democratic rights.
The text, the ballot box, and the right to cast an informed vote
Bill 307’s override pushed s.2(b) aside and brought the Charter’s democratic rights to the
forefront, drawing attention to core questions about the relationship between s.3 and s.33. Under

Leckey & Mendelsohn,”The Notwithstanding Clause”, supra note 7 at 198-99 (discussing the electorate and
legislative accountability).
33
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s.3, the right to vote is tantamount to inviolate: the entitlement cannot be overridden and any
infringements are subject to an exacting standard of justification under s.1. In interpreting this
guarantee, the Supreme Court has been unequivocal that s.3 demands robust and vigilant protection
from interference by the state. 34 That conception of s.3 incorporates a basic and non-negotiable
postulate of democratic accountability. A second postulate of accountability extends the scope of
s.3 beyond the abstract right to vote and includes functional components such as the right to play
a meaningful role in electoral discourse, the right to cast an informed vote, and the right to effective
representation.35
The democratic principle and democratic accountability require a functional approach that
includes entitlements that make the right to vote meaningful. In recognition of that, the s.3
jurisprudence interprets the right to vote generously and inclusively of meaningful participation
and a right of access to information that could influence an informed vote. Notably, these
entitlements are not confined to the election, but extend beyond and throughout the pre-writ period.
In developing a conception of democratic rights under the Charter, the Court’s landmark decision
in Figueroa v. Canada also proposed a standard for breach that asks whether legislative measures
undermine s.3’s bundle of entitlements.36
There, the federal tax scheme created advantages for larger political parties vis-à-vis
smaller parties that did not meet a 50-candidate threshold. These advantages and the disparities

See, e.g., Sauvé v. Canada, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 519, at para. 15 (stating that “it is precisely when legislative choices
threaten to undermine the foundations of the participatory democracy guaranteed by the Charter that courts must be
diligent in in fulfilling their constitutional duty to protect the integrity of this system”); Frank v. Canada, [2019] 1
S.C.R. 3 at para. 44 (confirming that any intrusions on s.3’s “core democratic right” must be reviewed under a
“stringent” justification standard that “carefully and rigorously” reviews the government’s “proferred” justification
for the violation).
35
Figueroa v. Canada, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 913, at paras. 19-32 & 53-54 (explaining these entitlements).
36
Ibid. at paras. 54, 57, 58 (establishing that the question in every case is whether a measure undermines any of the
voter’s entitlements under s.3).
34
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they engendered were not limited to an electoral period but were of general application. 37 The
Supreme Court held that this disparity under the tax regulations violated the rights of members and
supporters of parties below the threshold, because it diminished their capacity to engage in
meaningful participation by introducing their ideas and opinions into the open dialogue and debate
the election process engenders. 38
In addition, Figueroa found that that the disparities for smaller parties had a “more general
adverse effect” on the s.3 rights of voters.39 As Iacobucci J. explained, the impact of the regulations
on those parties had larger implications in undermining the right of each citizen to information that
might influence their exercise of the vote. In finding a breach of s.3, he emphasized that a citizen
cannot vote in a way that accurately reflects their preferences without access to information that
enables them to assess the strengths and weakness of the political parties and their candidates. 40
There are compelling parallels between Figueroa and Working Families #2. While
Figueroa’s disparate tax rules disadvantaged smaller political parties, Bill 307’s advertising
restrictions dilute the voices of third parties political participants, to the point of effectively
preventing them from exercising rights of democratic participation for a prolonged period prior to
an election. One difference is that the disparity in Bill 307 is not between political parties – which
are not subject to the 12-month restrictions – but between political parties and third party
participants.41 For purposes of s.3, that is not a principled difference. It matters little whether the
restrictions are aimed at smaller political parties, as in Figueroa, or at third party speakers

37

Ibid. at para. 47 (explaining that the regulations relating to parties below the statutory threshold applied outside
the writ period).
38
Ibid. at para. 53.
39
Ibid. at para. 54 .
40
Ibid. See also para. 57 (explaining how the regulations undermined the right to exercise the vote in a manner that
“accurately reflects” the voter’s preference).
41
In leaving Bill 254’s 6-month period for restrictions on political spending intact, Bill 307 created a significant
disparity between those parties and s.2(b)’s third party political advertisers.
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exercising their democratic rights under s.2(b): in both instances, the rights of voters are at stake.
Bill 307’s limits on third party participation substantially limited and unquestionably undermined
voter access to information that could influence the ballot. Though limits on third party political
advertising that violate s.3 might be justifiable, that is a s.1 issue and does not arise in in
determining the threshold question of breach. In addressing that issue, the question under Figueroa
is whether Bill 307’s 12-month restrictions on third party political advertising undermine the rights
of voters under s.3.
A conception of s.3 that valorizes these entitlements is fortified by the democratic principle
and its corollary of a right to participate in the free discussion of public affairs. As noted above,
City of Toronto accepted this principle and its status as one of the Constitution’s unwritten
principles that legitimately informs the interpretation of s.3. There, the Supreme Court described
it as a principle by which the Constitution is “to be understood and interpreted,” and one that
includes the right of citizens to participate in the process of representative and responsible
government.42 In particular, the Court re-affirmed that the democratic principle is “relevant as a
guide to the interpretation of the constitutional text” because it supports “an understanding of free
expression as including political expression in furtherance of a political campaign”. 43 That same
principle is yet more indispensable to the interpretation of s.3.
The principle of free and open discourse has deep pedigree in the constitutional
jurisprudence, tracing its pre-Charter lineage from the Alberta Press Case, to Switzman v. Elbling,
and from there to the Charter.44 In the Alberta Press Case, Chief Justice Duff famously stated that

42

City of Toronto, supra note 17, at para. 77.
Ibid. at paras. 77, 78.
44
The most celebrated pre-Charter decisions are Reference: Re Alberta Legislation, [1938], S.C.R. 100 (the
“Alberta Press Case”); R. v. Boucher, [1951] S.C.R. 265; Saumur v. Quebec (City), [1953], 2 S.C.R. 299; and
Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285. For a recent discussion of the formative role of these pre-Charter decisions,
see J. Cameron, “Resetting the Foundations: Renewing Freedom of Expression under s.2(b) of the Charter”, in B.
43
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democratic institutions derive their efficacy from the free public discussion of affairs, and that
citizens have a “fundamental right to express freely [their] untrammelled opinion about
government policies and discuss matters of public concern”. 45 While his conception of democracy
would demand “the freest and fullest analysis and examination from every point of view of
political proposals”, Cannon J.’s endorsed “the right of the people” for access to information on
questions of public interest “from sources independent of the government”. 46 The Alberta Press
Case was followed many years later by Boucher v. the King, in which Rand J. explicitly confirmed
the principle of accountability in stating that “the administrators of what we call democratic
government have come to be looked upon as servants, bound to carry out their duties accountably
to the public”.47 In Switzman v. Elbling, Rand J. spoke of the “free public opinion of an open
society” and the “condition of a virtually unobstructed access to and diffusion of ideas”. 48 These
quotes are representative, but not exhaustive, of the degree to which accountability is linked in the
jurisprudence to a process of open and unfettered public discourse. City of Toronto contemplates
that this legacy can inform the interpretation of s.3, and in principle it must.
Nor are these views about the vital role of unobstructed access to ideas outdated. Rather,
the Secession Reference incorporated a pre-Charter conception of democratic engagement and the
bonds between accountability and a free and open democratic process. As the Court explained, the
democratic principle predates the modern Constitution and is a “baseline against which the framers
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of our Constitution, and subsequently, our elected representatives under it, have always
operated.”49 The Secession Reference went on to state that this principle is fundamentally
connected to the Charter’s promotion of self-government, as reflected in the guarantees protected
by ss.3 and 4 of the Charter.50 As the Court stated, s.4’s exemption from s.33’s legislative override
affirms the democratic principle “with particular clarity”. 51
The significance of these unwritten principles to s.3 and Working Families #2 is this. Bill
307’s use of the override against s.2(b) also and additionally undermines citizen access to
information that is the sine qua non of democratic participation and accountability. The affront to
s.3 is not minor, but severe, insulating the incumbent government and other political parties from
a process of pre-election accountability in the public discourse. Bill 307 violated the s.2(b) rights
of third parties by substantially impairing their participation in political discourse. In addition, it
undermined the democratic rights of the electorate, who were denied the benefit of unfettered
debate on the merits of a government – as well as other parties and their candidates – that were
standing for election. By subordinating democratic participation to the goal of protecting political
incumbents, Bill 307 impoverished the electoral process and its foundation in principles of
transparency and accountability.
The democratic principle and democratic accountability are a vital adjunct to the
interpretation of ss.3 and 33, and fall squarely within City of Toronto’s directions for their use in
decisionmaking. As explained, ss.3 and 33 are textually bound by a synchronous and immutable
5-year interval of democratic accountability. In principle, preserving rights of meaningful
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participation and access to information about the electoral process is as central to s.33 as it is to
s.3.
Section s.33 is an integral part of the Charter that interacts with and must be interpreted
alongside other provisions which not only include, but point directly at the Charter’s democratic
rights. That is why the democratic principle and democratic accountability are fundamentally
implicated when s.33 engages s.3’s entitlements. In such circumstances, s.33’s underlying
assumption of democratic accountability inflects the interpretation of s.3’s entitlements and the
role they play in protecting the integrity of the democratic process. Override legislation that
undermines the integrity of the democratic process – by stifling voter access to information on
issues of public interest from sources independent of the government – cannot satisfy s.33’s
requirement of democratic accountability.

Conclusion
In Quebec (AG) v. 9147-0732 and City of Toronto, the Supreme Court addressed models
of constitutional interpretation, and pushed back against interpretive principles and sources not
proximate to the text.52 Despite focusing on the text and ballot box, City of Toronto accepted that
the text is not an exclusive interpretive tool and agreed that unwritten principles play a valuable
role in purposive interpretation. 53 As the analysis above demonstrated, the constitutionality of Bill
307 under s.3 raises issues that fall squarely within the Court’s conception of unwritten
constitutional principles and their role in interpretation. The texts of ss.3 and 33 address and
safeguard the accountability of the ballot box, and in doing so re-inforce the primacy of the
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democratic principle and its requirement of accountability. Put shortly, a theory of purposive
interpretation is at work, demonstrating how the text works seamlessly with the democratic
principle and democratic accountability to protect the integrity of the ballot box. Section 33’s
foundation in the ballot box demands a generous interpretation of s.3, and a conclusion that Bill
307’s use of the override to defeat the s.2(b)’s rights of third party speakers violated the democratic
rights of citizen voters.
Bill 307 could override s.2(b)’s guarantee of expressive freedom, but not the rights of the
voter under s.3 of the Charter. The legislature’s restrictions on third party political advertising
undermined voter access to information – including opinions, perspectives and points of view –
that could influence the minds of voters in deciding how to cast their ballot. The breach of s.3 in
this instance is informed by the scope and extent of the infringement, which applied for a full
twelve months prior to the writ period and targeted the voices of third party participants, but not
political parties. As explained above, s.3’s entitlements are not confined to the election per se but,
in the interest of accountability, must extend into the pre-writ period. In the circumstances, it is
less difficult to imagine that the restrictions had a substantial and even crucial impact on the s.3
rights of voters than to assume that the lack of discourse arising from Bills 254 and 307 made no
difference to the electorate.
It is telling that voter turnout in Ontario’s provincial election on June 3, 2022 was the
lowest on record.54 Though voter apathy may be a multifactorial phenomenon, both generally and
in this election, it is not far-fetched to conclude that the Ontario government dampened voter
engagement by doubling down on rights of democratic participation. First, Bill 254 prevented third
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party political advertisers from robust engagement in the pre-election discourse for a prolonged
period of twelve months, and violated their rights under s.2(b) in doing so. Then, after Bill 254
was declared unconstitutional, the government further undermined democratic accountability by
invoking s.33 to all but negate the violation and effectively insulate itself from criticism for
overriding ss.2 and 7 to 15 of the Charter.
The Charter’s democratic rights loom larger when s.33 legislation negates s.2(b)’s rights
of democratic participation. Wisely, s.3 was excluded from s.33 to ensure that governments could
not use the override to break the line of accountability that is the foundation of Canada’s system
of democratic constitutionalism. Interpreting s.3 to protect access to information and the principle
of accountability links to and re-inforces the conditions under which it is legitimate for a legislature
to rely on the override. Bill 307 and Working Families #2 demonstrate that the legislature cannot
invoke s.33 to override s.2(b)’s rights of democratic participation and simultaneously undermine
the democratic rights of voters under s.3. Somewhat paradoxically, it is necessary to invalidate
Bill 307 under s.3 to protect the principle of accountability and legitimacy of the override under
s.33.

